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7 115 models (log Bayes factor of relaxed compared to strict molecular clock (logBF R-S ) = 0.06 and -116 0.3, respectively; Fig 1A) . Stronger evidence for the strict clock was observed when the EBSP 117 coalescent was implemented (logBF R-S = -4.45). Similarity between molecular clocks was also 118 demonstrated by the limited impact of the molecular clock assumptions on phylogenetic tree 119 parameter estimates such as evolutionary rate and time to the most recent common ancestor 120 (TMRCA; Fig 1B and 1C) . For example, under the EBSP coalescent, the relaxed mean clock rate 121 was 6.84x10 -3 substitutions per site per year (95% highest posterior density (HPD): 6.09x10 -3 -122 7.59x10 -3 ) compared to the strict clock rate estimate of 6. 158 so are referred to by a particular term. All methods estimated that viral dispersal from layer 159 chicken premises to turkey premises occurred more frequently than from turkey premises to 160 layer chicken (Supplemental Table S1 ). In the structured coalescent, the migration rate from 9 161 layer chicken to turkey premises was much greater than the reverse (migration rate from 162 chickens to turkeys: 12.6, 95% HPD: 6.2 -18.7; migration rate from turkeys to chickens: 0.7, 163 95% HPD: 0.00001 -2.2). The transition rates between the poultry industries estimated from the 164 discrete trait diffusion model were much more similar to each other (transition rate from 165 chickens to turkeys: 1.4, 95% HPD: 0.04 -3.9; transition rate from turkeys to chickens: 0.3, 95%
166 HPD: 0.003 -0.9). These models suggest the dispersion of virus between poultry industries was 167 not symmetrical, potentially indicating poultry type played a role in the outbreak dynamics.
168
To formally test this hypothesis, we used epidemiological compartmental model 169 equations to describe the coalescent process (18). Four competing scenarios were constructed 170 (Fig 2A) . Models 1 and 2 described a homogenous poultry population that differed by the 171 presence of a continuous external viral source in Model 2. In contrast, Models 3 and 4 described 172 a host population stratified by poultry production system, again differing based on an external Table S2 ).
181 This suggests the midwestern portion of the 2015 HPAI outbreak was isolated from external 182 sources but most likely structured by poultry production system. Four transmission rates were 183 estimated for Model 3 to describe the interaction between the layer chicken and turkey 10 184 populations: two within-poultry system rates (β T and β C ) and two between-poultry system rates 185 (β TC and β CT ). The model estimated the transmission rates within the turkey production system to 186 be highest (β T = 11.6, 95%HPD: 2.0 -22.0), followed by transmission rates from chicken farms 187 to turkey farms (β CT = 4.9, 95% HPD: 0.6 -9.6). The lowest transmission rate was estimated 188 from turkey farms to chicken farms (β TC = 0.1, 95% HPD: 0.02 -0.22). This is similar to the 189 results of the structured coalescent model and discrete trait model described above 190 (Supplemental Table S1 ). Infectious period of a farm also varied substantially between the two 191 production systems. A HPAI-positive turkey premises was estimated to remain infectious for 5.7
192 days (95% HPD: 4.3 -10.5), whereas layer chicken premises were estimated to remain Fig 3A. The three largest transition rates were observed 225 between county groups within the same state, particularly Minnesota and Iowa ( Fig 3B; 226 Supplemental Table S3 ). The most frequent transitions occurred from Minnesota mixed poultry 227 counties to Minnesota turkey-exclusive counties (median rate: 3.3 transitions per year; 95% HPD 228 0.7 -6.4; BF = 490.6). In Minnesota, the reverse rate (i.e., from turkey-exclusive counties to 229 mixed poultry counties) was also decisively supported with a relatively high transition rate (2. 
325
To help improve identifiability of the remaining parameters within the compartmental 326 model, expected prior distributions for the infectious period of affected premises were specified 327 based on reported USDA data (7). Despite the informative assumption, the infectious period of 328 layer chicken farms was estimated to be longer than expected. In our model, we assumed a 5-day 329 period between the onset of infectivity of the farm and reporting of HPAI infection. Delays in the 330 identification and/or reporting of HPAI infection could result in infectious periods that begin 331 well before the assumed 5 days. Continued infectivity beyond the completion of flock 332 depopulation is another likely contributor to prolonged infectious periods. Although commercial 333 poultry depopulation occurred on average 6.4 days after National Veterinary Services Laboratory 334 (NVSL) HPAI confirmation, premises were not considered to be virus-free until, on average, 335 87.7 days following confirmation (7). In either case, our models suggest layer chicken farms 336 remained infectious for much longer than turkey farms, potentially explaining why the 337 transmission rate from chicken farms to turkey farms was higher than its counterpart. In fact, Table   429 S5.
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